CRT Forum – special series
Military doctrine is constantly evolving, shaped by technological advancements, battlefield experiences, and emerging operational demands. Today, with the advent of Composite Rubber Tracks (CRT), defence forces are presented with an opportunity to enhance vehicle mobility, durability, and adaptability across diverse terrains and conflict scenarios.
This interview will leverage the insights of a Maj Gen (Ret.) William ‘Bill’ Hix, Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, US Army to explore the role of CRT in enhancing operational longevity, optimising performance in varied terrains, and driving tactical decision-making. By tying in real-world experiences, the conversation will position CRT solutions as an essential element in modernising defence capabilities while ensuring mission success.
How often, during your service, did defence doctrine need to adapt to new technologies, and what challenges or successes did you encounter during these transitions?
Over the past 40 years, the US Army adapted its defense doctrine on several occasions, responding to changes in threat, technology and strategic direction. Airland Battle was borne from a renewed focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and technological developments such as the Sagger anti-tank guided missile, that changed the dynamics of the battlefield in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The 1982 version of Airland Battle changed the US Army’s core concept from an active defense, trading space for time, to an inherently offensive focus, attacking the enemy throughout its depth. The 1986 version raised the Army’s focus, emphasizing the operational level of war. Coupled with new equipment and force design and force mix, the Airland Battle Army underwent a fundamental transformation. Subordinate doctrine followed by new units at all levels and accompanying tactics, techniques and procedures.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, US Army doctrine exhibited iterative changes as the information age matured. Coupled with Force XXI experimentation and the integration of developments from that experimentation, particularly the networking of US Army formations, were increasingly optimized by several capstone doctrinal manuals as understanding of the power of information increased in clarity. Changes in capstone doctrine and fielding of new equipment and attendant changes to US Army organizations were also accompanied by doctrinal manuals that addressed unit employment and tactics, techniques and procedures.
The mid-2000s saw the US Army employed in Iraq and Afghanistan and development of new counterinsurgency doctrine and new tactics, techniques and procedures followed, both to address the counterinsurgency mission at lower unit levels, but also to accommodate a flood of new equipment, such as Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and counter improvised explosive device (CIED) systems introduced in the theater.
More recently, informed by changes in Russian and Chinese military capabilities, particularly a proliferation of space, air, and land based sensors, long range fires, and unmanned aerial vehicles, and command and control networks, new enemy doctrines emphasizing anti-access and area denial, and evidence from combat operations in Ukraine and observed exercises elsewhere, the US Army began to evolve its thinking from unified operations to multi-domain operations, integrating land, air, maritime, space, and cyber operations. US Army operational doctrine in the recently published FM 3.0 Operations operationalizes multidomain operations for the threats posed by adversaries in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East.
Recent changes in US Army guidance and direction that will see unit changes, such as the mobile brigade combat team and the multi-domain task force, new equipment fielded such as Infantry Squad Vehicle, a host of unmanned aerial vehicles, and long-range missiles will result in additional changes to doctrine for units and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Can you recount an operation where the terrain presented significant challenges, and how did reliable mobility solutions (such as track systems) contribute to the success or failure of the mission?
In developmental efforts in support of several US Army ground combat vehicles, including Stryker, several infantry fighting vehicle prototypes and iterations of the M1 tank, the terrain in eastern Poland, thick with lakes, rivers, and streams, posed particular challenges. In particular, cross-country mobility in the wet and soft terrain in that area, in addition to weight bearing capacity of bridges in the area were vexing, potentially channelizing those systems to a limited number of movement corridors.
In the analysis associated with each system, composite rubber track was always considered. Analysis demonstrated the utility of these systems. However, with the M1, composite rubber tracks were not at the time capable of carrying the weight. However, they proved viable for use with Stryker and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) options. At that time, their utility was not universally accepted for use with Striker and IFVs. This is beginning to change, with M113 and robotic combat vehicles making routine use of composite rubber tracks (CRT). Likewise, both XM30 competitors have a continuous CRT as part of their digital designs. Further, improvements in CRT design can now support the M1E3, an important development that will benefit the mobility and resilience of US Army armour operations.
In Iraq, enemy use of larger scale improvised explosive devices (IED) against M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles often resulted in steel vehicle tracks being blown off. These attacks very often resulted in mobility kill son the vehicle, preventing it from continuing its mission or withdrawing under its own power to a more secure area and short tracking the platform or repairing the track required the crew to dismount and a portion of the unit to pull off its assigned mission to provide overwatch security or deploy a quick reaction force to the site while repairs and/or recovery was conducted. While CRT was not then capable of employment on the M1 Abrams in Iraq due to vehicle weight, the resilience of CRT would have been a welcome feature for the M2 Bradley on operations in Iraq. The M1A2 was upgraded to deal with IEDs, with the Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK) package, adding some 7800 lbs to the weight of the system without material improvement to its tracks.
This would likely be the case in Afghanistan as well, except the US Army did not employ tracked armoured vehicle in Afghanistan. The US Marine Corps did deploy a limited number of M1s to Afghanistan. On one rotation, a marine tank company had 19 IED strikes; only two strikes required higher echelon maintenance. Note the IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan were both significant, but the threat in Iraq was more pervasive and severe.
How crucial is the durability of equipment like vehicle tracks during extended operations or deployments, and what role does this reliability play in mission outcomes?
Operational availability is critical to mission planning and execution. The foundation of a commander’s calculus of the combat power available and his concept of operations to achieve an assigned mission rest on their assumptions regarding the combat systems that will be available as the unit closes in on the objective. Operational availability considers the unit’s mission capable systems and some projection of possible systems loss due to maintenance issues and enemy action; the latter two areas are informed by experience but are unpredictable. Prognostics will eventually improve projections of maintenance faults during operations, but enemy action will remain an experience and assumption-based exercise. Likewise, system development, such as favoring reliability, maintainability and availability (RAM) as a key performance parameter and selection of system components can also contribute to the operational availability of a combat system.
In this regard, the use of steel track, heretofore an industry and operational standard, can often result in as much of a fifth of a unit’s tracked vehicles unavailable at any given time due to required maintenance, replacement, and field expedient repair of thrown or damaged track during operations. Maintenance projections then drive maintenance planning including how much maintenance service capability, mechanics, service vehicles and repair parts go forward on an operation, all of which require security and logistics support that increase overall burdens on an operation. In these calculations, it is axiomatic that the more reliable the components of a combat system are, the less maintenance support is required to move forward on the operation, with all its own resource requirements, particularly security and fuel consumption.
Composite rubber track demonstrates greater resilience and reliability over steel track, with additional steel track consuming significant weight and cubic space on a combat system and in unit and supporting maintenance capabilities and stores. Reducing that requirement due to the improved operational resilience and reliability of CRT can contribute to improved operational availability. In that regard, CRT has demonstrated it can deliver four-times the track miles of steel track on a given system, contributing to system and unit operational agility, while saving time, manpower, and money. Similarly, CRT weighs about half of what steel track does, with attendant efficiency improvements in fuel consumption, reportedly as much as thirty-percent, and transportation of replacement stocks.
From a tactical perspective, how does a dependable and adaptive track system influence on-the-ground decision-making in fast-changing combat scenarios?
Throwing track or losing track due to a mine or IED strike as well as secondary shrapnel from steel track possibly injuring dismounted soldiers can disrupt the tempo of an operation at very inopportune times. The blast resilience and composition of CRT helps mitigate these risks.
In high-pressure situations requiring immediate response, how important is it for vehicles to have durable, low-maintenance track systems, and how could CRT enhance unit readiness?
As discussed in #3 above, CRT resilience and reliability helps mitigate operational availability issues. Likewise, that resilience reduces the amount of additional track that must accompany a unit in its maintenance stores at each echelon of the deploying formation. Equally important, as discussed in #2, durable, low-maintenance track systems can reduce the need for combat system crews to dismount to self-repair track failures, pull combat power from the operation to secure a system while higher echelon maintenance comes forward to either repair or recover the combat system.
All of these scenarios disrupt unit operational tempo and momentum. Recovery is more deleterious as recovery does not merely delay the operational availability of a system; rather, recovery diminishes available combat power to continue the mission with little prospect of replacing that combat power.
Looking at the long-term operational sustainability of vehicles, how do you see innovations like CRT contributing to reduced wear and tear and overall maintenance efficiency?
CRT resilience and reliability reduces the maintenance service requirements for a combat system, both in regards to the track itself given its operational range exceeding that of steel track by a factor of four-X, and the overall wear and tear of the platform, given its lighter weight and significant reduction in vibration. Reductions in maintenance demand, reportedly by as much or more than 65%, has positive effects on upstream demands for maintenance structure and manpower requirements.
Given the current and future demands of the battlefield, how easily do you think CRT could be integrated into existing doctrines, and what benefits or challenges would you foresee?
While the use of CRT has few, if any direct impacts to doctrine, improved platform performance (speed, fuel consumption, crew demand, etc.), reduced weight, and decreasing operating costs and maintenance requirements along with reduced impact of civil infrastructure will have positive effects on unit performance, maintenance demand, fuel consumption and logistics operations, all of which will increase operational availability and agility.
While US allies in NATO and AUKUS tend to act on their own interests in combat vehicle development and procurement, and are often more cost conscious than the US, US acceptance of CRT will likely break down any inherent obstacles to adoption across all allied forces.
Based on your experience, what advice would you offer to defence leaders when evaluating the importance of mobility, terrain adaptability, and equipment longevity in military strategy?
The barrier to entry is a combination of a lack of familiarity with the relevant advantages of CRT in terms of track, platform, and crew performance and the cultural bias of the armoured corps who currently operate main battle tanks that cannot employ CRT and consequently are sceptical of their utility.
Better communication of the relative advantages of CRT use across the metrics briefed (low or no maintenance, operate at longer ranges, reduce the logistic demand, reduced infrastructure damage, increased durability and reduced weight, health-human/system improvements, reduce noise by 13db and vibration by 70%, and increased mobility) as compared to the relative performance of steel track is a foundation. Accelerating CRT capability to enable 65-70T platforms will seal the deal.
Beyond the inability to support main battle tanks at 65-70T, CRT has no real drawbacks and is making market penetration and demonstrating its utility across a number of armies. There are, however a number of “myths,” such as perceptions that the track is more vulnerable to mine strikes and fire, which must be busted. A communications and demonstration plan, not merely in the acquisition community and armoured centres of excellence, but in the operational force that clearly addresses those “myths” can go a long way. Likewise, making the US Congress aware, particularly armed services and defence appropriation staff can help. Rapid resolution of weight bearing limitations will also kill the final “myth” which currently remains a fact – CRT cannot support a main battle tank.
Finally, steel track has no discernible advantage over CRT; in fact, CRT has matured to a point where steel track is at a disadvantage in nearly every consideration, other than an inability to support main battle tanks at 65-70T. The challenges, as discussed above, are cultural and a number of “myths,” such as perceptions that the track is more vulnerable to mine strikes and fire, which must be busted.
CRT derived improvements in platform performance (speed, fuel consumption, crew demand, etc.), reduced weight, and decreasing operating costs with reduced impact of civil infrastructure will have positive effects on unit performance, maintenance demand, fuel consumption and logistics operations, all of which will increase operational availability and agility, make the case. Soucy’s own data on CRT use across the metrics briefed (low or no maintenance, operate at longer ranges, reduce the logistic demand, reduced infrastructure damage, increased durability and reduced weight, health-human/system improvements, reduce noise by 13db and vibration by 70%, and increased mobility) as compared to the relative performance of steel track is a foundation. Life cycle costs, even for a tier two program is increasingly important given tighter budgets and increasing operational and personnel costs. Replacement of CRT, as with any repair part or spare, they are paid for out of operational and maintenance budgets, savings in maintenance costs puts more money towards training and readiness and reduces spares carried by a unit on deployment. The operational force will look on that favorably. Accelerating CRT capability to enable 65-70T platforms will further tilt the balance in CRT’s favor.
Soucy Defense will host the first-ever 𝐂𝐑𝐓 𝐅𝐎𝐑𝐔𝐌 — an exclusive event under the theme “Composite Rubber Track: Mobility by Design”.
This exclusive event will be held in London, UK, ahead of DSEI 2025 and will welcome a select group of high-profile guests. Scheduled for Monday, 8th September 2025 at the Army & Navy Club, London.
🔒 The 𝐂𝐑𝐓 𝐅𝐎𝐑𝐔𝐌 is an invite-only event. Contact us to express your interest: [email protected] (limited places available).
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